Background
Trigger strategy is an essential concept in game theory, specifically within the study of repeated non-cooperative games. It demonstrates how individuals can enforce cooperative behavior through the threat of future punishment, thus promoting longer-term collaboration and stability.
Historical Context
The notion of trigger strategy gained widespread recognition through its application in the analysis of repeated games, particularly highlighted in research during the second half of the 20th century. Key contributions from scholars such as Robert Axelrod, who conducted experiments on cooperative strategies in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, have elevated the understanding and practical implications of trigger strategies.
Definitions and Concepts
A trigger strategy is a strategy in a non-cooperative repeated game in which a player cooperates until the opponent is observed not to cooperate. The observation of non-cooperation triggers a switch to punishment of the opponent. Essentially, it serves as a mechanism to sustain mutual cooperation over time by employing the threat of future retaliation.
Example:
- Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma:
- Initial strategy: Both players choose {Don’t confess}
- Trigger: If one player chooses {Confess}
- Result: The betrayed player switches to {Confess} in all subsequent rounds, punishing the defector
Major Analytical Frameworks
Different schools of economic thought have variously analyzed trigger strategies, integrating them into broader theories of cooperation and strategic behavior.
Classical Economics
Classical economics largely overlooks such strategic interactions, focusing more on rational decision-making in static contexts.
Neoclassical Economics
Neoclassical economics embraces concepts from game theory to analyze strategic decision-making, making use of trigger strategies to explain phenomena like collusion in oligopoly markets.
Keynesian Economic
Keynesian economics does not focus heavily on game theoretical concepts like trigger strategies but accepts their importance in dynamic and behavioral applications.
Marxian Economics
The strategic interactions modeled by trigger strategies are largely absent in traditional Marxian economics, although recent Marxian analyses have incorporated aspects of game theory to discuss labor and capital negotiations.
Institutional Economics
Trigger strategies are relevant in institutional economics to understand how informal institutions—norms and unwritten rules—maintain cooperation and discourage deviant behavior through mutual deterrence.
Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economists explore how actual human behavior may deviate from the trigger strategy predictions due to bounded rationality, biases, and preferences for fairness or retaliation.
Post-Keynesian Economics
Post-Keynesian economics subtly integrates strategic interaction by recognizing the importance of historical time and institutional structure, where trigger strategies might play a role in policy and firm behaviors.
Austrian Economics
Austrian economics views individual actions and strategic decisions (including possible trigger strategies) through the lens of spontaneous order and individual expectations.
Development Economics
Trigger strategies can be applied to understand how long-term cooperation and trust can be developed in fragile economies, preventing actions that could undermine social welfare.
Monetarism
Monetarism’s primary focus on the long-run effects of monetary policy doesn’t typically engage with the strategic implications of trigger strategies in repeated games.
Comparative Analysis
Trigger strategies illustrate how the threat of punishment can maintain cooperation among rational players across different economic frameworks. By comparing its application to concepts like collusion, contract enforcement, or informal sanctions, we gain insights into its efficacy in promoting stability and order.
Case Studies
- Collusion Among Firms: Examines how firms might use trigger strategies to maintain collusive prices.
- Labor Negotiations: Demonstrates how unions and employers might engage in cooperative behavior through the use of trigger strategies to avoid strikes or unfavorable conditions.
Suggested Books for Further Studies
- “The Evolution of Cooperation” by Robert Axelrod
- “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
- “Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships” by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Related Terms with Definitions
- Tit for Tat: A strategy in repeated games where a player replicates the opponent’s previous action, promoting cooperative behavior.
- Non-Cooperative Game: A game where players make decisions independently, often leading to suboptimal outcomes without coordination.
- Nash Equilibrium: A state in a game where no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, underpinning many game-theoric scenarios including repeated games.
