Background
Regulatory capture describes a phenomenon where regulatory agencies, which are created to act in the public’s best interest, end up serving the commercial or special interests of the industry or sector they are supposed to regulate. This can occur due to various factors, including political pressures, economic incentives, and the revolving door between regulators and industry staff.
Historical Context
The notion of regulatory capture can be traced back to the early 20th century with references in works by academics like George Stigler. However, it significantly came to the forefront in the 1970s due to the discourse generated by public choice theories and increased scrutinies of governmental regulations.
Definitions and Concepts
Regulatory capture is defined as the process by which regulatory agencies become dominated by the industries or interests they are supposed to be regulating. This subversion can transform the regulatory body from a public protector into an enforcer of the regulated firm’s interests, compromising public welfare.
Major Analytical Frameworks
Classical Economics
In classical economics, regulatory actions are justified for public goods and externality corrections, assuming the neutrality of the regulators.
Neoclassical Economics
Neoclassical economists also support regulations for market failures but warn against the potential inefficiency arising from regulatory capture.
Keynesian Economic
Keynesian economics focuses on broader market corrections via government interventions but doesn’t address the specific pitfalls of regulatory capture extensively, though the ramifications impact legislative effectiveness.
Marxian Economics
Marxian theorists may interpret regulatory capture as another instance of capitalist enterprises exerting undue influence over state functions, perpetuating class dominance.
Institutional Economics
Institutional economics considers regulatory capture as a result of institutional failings, including how rules and incentives within organizations can deform regulatory practices.
Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economics analyzes regulatory capture through the lens of cognitive biases, incentives, and the social interactions of regulators with industry personnel.
Post-Keynesian Economics
Post-Keynesians emphasize the dynamic pressures of economic and social relations, and regulatory capture highlights structural weaknesses in regulatory institutions or market designs.
Austrian Economics
Austrian economists critique regulatory interventions per se, arguing they often create pathways for regulatory capture, ultimately harming the economic process due to unintended consequences.
Development Economics
In the context of development economics, regulatory capture weakens governance mechanisms, undercuts efforts to stabilize runaway markets, and can aggravate corruption issues.
Monetarism
Monetarist perspectives focus more on monetary control rather than regulatory processes but recognize that capture can distort effective monetary interventions.
Comparative Analysis
Across these models, regulatory capture garners attention for its potential to skew otherwise well-meaning regulations. Classical and neoclassical economists express difficulties with regulatory oversight efficacy, while differing its necessity. Keynesians tackle regulation holistically without direct focus on capture effects. The divergence reflects on the multifaceted layers capturing posits in theoretical applicabilities.
Case Studies
Instances like the financial collapse of 2008 where banking regulators overlooked severe financial malpractices or the favorable regulatory attitudes experienced by tech giants count historically as notable markers of regulatory capture.
Suggested Books for Further Studies
- “The Theory of Economic Regulation” by George Stigler.
- “Captured: The Corporate Infiltration of American Democracy” by Sheldon Whitehouse.
- “The Logic of Collective Action” by Mancur Olson.
- “The Power of Bureaucracy in Educational Decision Making” by Herbert Kaufman.
Related Terms with Definitions
- Public Choice Theory: A theory that applies economics to the study of political behavior, focusing on the role of self-interest in public decisions.
- Revolving Door: A metaphorical term describing the movement of personnel between roles as legislators and regulators and the industries affected by the legislation and regulation.
- Lobbying: Activities aimed at influencing public officials and especially members of a legislative body on legislation.
- Conflict of Interest: A situation where a public official’s decisions might be influenced by the official’s personal interests.
